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VOTING FOR WAGE CONCESSIONS: THE CASE 
OF THE 1982 GM-UAW NEGOTIATIONS 
BRUCE E. KAUFMAN and JORGE MARTINEZ-VAZQUEZ* 
The authors of this paper use the median voter model to predict the 
patterns of rank-and-file voting on wage concessions in a multiplant 
setting, then test those predictions using data from the 1982 GM-UAW 
negotiations. The model predicts that workers in plants with large 
layoffs will vote in favor of a wage concession only if they believe that a 
concession will save their jobs. Surprisingly, workers in plants with 
growing or stable employment are also actually more likely to vote Yes. 
A third prediction is that the Yes vote will be smallest in plants with the 
most adversarial labor relations. The empirical analysis supports all 
three predictions. 
ONE of the most important industrial relations developments of the 1980s 
has been the emergence and spread of 
concession bargaining. Mitchell (1985) 
estimates that between 1980 and 1984, 
one-third to one-half of all unionized 
workers were covered under new con­
tracts that froze or cut wage rates. Many 
other employers demanded wage conces­
sions but were unable to obtain them. In a 
number of cases, in fact, union workers 
* The authors are Associate Professors of Econom­
ics at Georgia State University. They thank the 
College of Business Administration of Georgia State 
University for financial support, the United Automo­
bile Workers Union and the General Motors Corpo­
ration for data, and David Sjoquist for helpful 
comments. 
EDITOR'S NOTE: Although this article, and the one 
following, deal with the same subject—the determi­
nants of contract ratification votes in the auto 
industry—and analyze similar voting data, they were 
prepared quite independently of each other. By a 
happy coincidence, however, both papers were 
submitted to the Review, and later accepted, at about 
the same time. We thought it would be interesting to 
ask each set of authors to compare the two papers, 
and they have done so in comments that appear 
following the second paper. 
voted down concessions even when the 
employer threatened to close the plant or 
declare bankruptcy if wage relief was not 
given (see Easterbrook 1983). 
Despite the prevalence of concession 
bargaining, there has been relatively little 
research on the factors that influence a 
union's policy toward granting wage con­
cessions. To the best of our knowledge, 
the only case study of union wage conces­
sions to be published in the last ten years is 
Cappelli's (1985) analysis of concession 
bargaining in the meat packing and tire 
industries. His study, however, focused 
primarily on whether a union will agree to 
negotiate over concessions, not whether 
concessions are actually accepted. As we 
shall show, this distinction is an important 
one. In earlier years, by way of contrast, a 
number of case studies of union wage 
policy in a crisis situation were published 
(Herrnstadt 1954; Levinson 1960; Green-
berg 1968; Juris 1969). But although these 
studies contributed a number of insights 
about union attitudes toward concession 
bargaining, none developed a formal 
model of union wage policy from which 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1988). © by Cornell University. 
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hypotheses could be deduced and tested, 
nor did any perform a quantitative analy­
sis of the factors that influence union 
members to vote for or against concessions 
in the contract ratification process. 
In this paper we attempt to fill these 
gaps in the literature by studying the wage 
concession negotiated between the Gen­
eral Motors Corporation and the United 
Automobile Workers Union in April 1982. 
This analysis is unique in several respects. 
First, previous studies have focused on 
concession bargaining at the level of the 
individual plant; this study examines con­
cession bargaining in a multiplant firm 
with more than 170 separate bargaining 
units. Second, we use a median voter 
model of union behavior to derive hypoth­
eses concerning the pattern of voting in a 
multiplant setting such as at GM. Several 
of these hypotheses are noteworthy, we 
believe, because they contradict conven­
tional wisdom as to which bargaining units 
should be most likely to vote for and 
against wage concessions. A third feature 
of the paper is that these hypotheses are 
tested through a regression analysis of the 
voting pattern among the UAW bargain­
ing units in the 1982 GM ratification vote. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous 
published study has examined actual vot­
ing data from a union contract ratifica­
tion. 
Background to Concessions 
Over most of the post—World War II 
period the UAW was able to win wage and 
benefit increases for its members at Gen­
eral Motors and the other auto producers 
that substantially exceeded the economy-
wide average. Between 1950 and 1980, for 
example, the ratio of hourly earnings of 
auto assemblers to production workers in 
the private nonagricultural economy rose 
from 1.18 to 1.55 (Katz 1985:21). Factors 
contributing to the union's bargaining 
success included an inelastic labor demand 
curve in the auto industry, strong secular 
growth in auto sales, and the union's 
ability to impose large strike costs on the 
producers. 
Although there were signs of trouble 
when the 1979 auto contracts were signed, 
particularly given the perilous financial 
condition of Chrysler, neither the auto 
companies nor the union could foresee 
the severity of the economic crisis that lay 
ahead. Auto production peaked in 1978 at 
9.2 million units, and then began to slide. 
In 1979 production was off only moder­
ately (8.1 million), but by 1982 it had 
plummeted to 5.1 million units. The most 
important reasons for the decline in 
domestic auto sales were the shift in 
consumer demand to compact and subcom-
pact cars due to the oil price shocks (see 
Hunker 1983), the recessions of 1980 and 
1981—82, and the double-digit interest 
rates. 
As sales declined, so did employment. 
At General Motors, employment of hourly 
workers plunged by one-third between 
1979 and 1982. At the time of the 
concession vote in April 1982, 140,000 
GM workers were on indefinite layoff. 
The decline in employment was not evenly 
spread across plants, however: some were 
hit far worse than others. Of GM's 25 
assembly plants, for example, between 
1979 and 1982 six closed, five were 
reduced from two shifts to one, five kept 
two shifts but reduced the line speed, and 
eight maintained production at 1979 lev­
els.1 
In the fall of 1981 Ford and GM asked 
the UAW to reopen the national contract, 
but the union refused. By early 1982, 
however, the crisis had deepened enough 
that the union reluctantly agreed. Facing 
the union leadership were the following 
facts. First, in February 1982 car sales hit 
the lowest level since 1948, with no 
upswing in sight. Second, indefinite lay­
offs in the auto industry had been above 
150,000 for two years. Many laid-off 
workers, therefore, had exhausted their 
SUB payments, with little prospect of 
re-employment in the industry. Third, in 
February GM announced seven plant 
closings. Finally, there was a growing 
1 These data come from Ward's Automotive Yearbook 
(1980:106; 1983:69). 
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realization on the part of the union 
leaders that the crisis in the industry 
would not completely disappear when the 
recession ended, but rather was the result 
of fundamental structural changes that 
opened up the high-cost domestic industry 
to much greater competition. One re­
sponse of the union was to try to limit 
competition from foreign producers 
through legislative enactment of a domesr 
tic content bill and stricter import quotas. 
Since both proposals faced considerable 
opposition from the Reagan administra­
tion, the UAW leadership realized that at 
least part of the solution to the industry's 
problems would have to come from 
concessions at the bargaining table. 
The GM Concession Contract 
In March 1982 the UAW Executive 
Council and the General Motors Corpora­
tion announced agreement on a new 
contract that contained significant cost 
concessions on the union's part. An impor­
tant consideration for GM was that several 
weeks earlier a similar pact had been 
reached at Ford. The contract was a 
30-month agreement. The union agreed 
to a freeze of base wage rates, elimination 
of the annual improvement factor (an 
annual 3 percent deferred wage increase), 
postponement of cost of living (COLA) 
payments, and elimination of all paid 
personal holidays (9 per year). The sav­
ings in labor cost to General Motors over 
the life of the contract was estimated at 10 
percent of current labor cost, or about $2 
per hour.2 Also of significance was the 
agreement by the union that individual 
locals could reopen plant-level supplemen­
tal contracts if a revision of work rules or 
work practices would make it possible for 
the company to continue production at 
the plant. 
In return for these concessions, the 
2 The material in this section is drawn from the 
United Automobile Workers Union newspaper, 
UAW-GM Report (March 1983), and a pamphlet, 
Analysis: General Motors Settlement (1982), put out by 
l.ocals Opposed to Concessions (UAW-LOC). 
company made a number of commitments 
to the union. First, GM agreed to rescind 
the announced closing of four plants, and 
instituted a 24-month moratorium on 
other plant closings related to outsourc­
ing. Second, the company established a 
profit sharing program. Third, a "Guaran­
teed Income Stream" program (GIS) was 
established that guaranteed 50 percent or 
more of hourly earnings until age 62 for 
two categories of worker: those employed 
as of March 1, 1982, with 10 years or more 
of seniority, who were laid off due to plant 
closings, and those employed as of the 
same date who had 15 years or more of 
seniority and were laid off for any other 
reason. Finally, the company also agreed 
to advance up to $200 million to the SUB 
fund and to begin a lifetime employment 
experiment at four plants. 
Opinion in the UAW about the conces­
sion contract was sharply split. The na­
tional leadership attempted to sell the 
package to the membership by stressing 
the improved job security the contract 
would bring and the projected payments 
from the profit sharing program. In this 
spirit, union president Douglas Fraser 
endorsed the contract as a way to "stop the 
hemorrhaging of GM workers' jobs" by 
allowing GM to be more cost-competitive 
with the Japanese. The headline of the 
union's newspaper to the GM membership 
declared "Contract to Save Thousands of 
jobs." 
There was, however, also considerable 
opposition to the concession contract in 
the union. A group called "Locals Op­
posed to Concessions" (LOG) actively 
lobbied the membership to vote against 
the contract. According to LOC, "This 
contract contributes nothing to job secu­
rity, and actually will cost our members 
10,000 jobs as well as $3 billion dollars in 
wages and benefits." In support of this 
contention, LOC argued that the elimina­
tion of the paid personal holidays meant 
that existing employees would be working 
4 percent more hours, allowing the com­
pany to cut employment by 10,000 work­
ers; the GIS program would do nothing 
for the 140,000 GM workers on layoff, 
•J 
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since it only protected workers employed 
as of March 1, 1982; the agreement by the 
union to allow individual locals to reopen 
plant-level agreements would decrease job 
security, since locals would become in­
volved in a bidding war for additional 
work; and the precarious financial posi­
tion of the companies was not due to 
excessive labor cost but was the result of 
management waste and inefficiency and 
external economic conditions such as the 
rise in gas prices, double-digit interest 
rates, and the overvalued dollar. 
The concession contract was put to a 
vote of the membership in April 1982. 
Under the UAW constitution, both em­
ployed and laid-off members were eligible 
to vote. The contract was narrowly ap­
proved by a 52 percent majority. Of the 
170 bargaining units at GM, 116 voted for 
the concessions and 54 voted against it. 
Although the bargaining units voting 
against concessions were distinctly in the 
minority, within those units the average 
No vote was 70 percent. 
Theoretical Model 
The voting outcome on the GM contract 
concession raises two interesting ques­
tions. First, what factors determine whether 
a majority of the rank and file at the 
company will vote for or against a wage 
concession? Second, what factors explain 
the pattern of voting among the bargain­
ing units? An answer to these questions 
requires a theoretical model of union 
behavior. Although there are several such 
models in the literature, the most appro­
priate, in our opinion, is the median voter 
model, since it explicitly captures the 
political nature of union decision-making 
and the inherent conflict of interests that 
exists among the union membership over 
the desirability of a wage cut.3 A median 
3 Other models of union behavior include the 
monopoly model and the efficient contract model 
(see MaCurdy and Pencavel 1986). Several fundamen­
tal features, however, render these models inade­
quate to study union acceptance of wage concessions. 
First, both the monopoly and efficient contract 
models assume identical preferences among the rank 
and file for the union's wage policy. Quite clearly, 
voter analysis of union wage concessions 
was undertaken in Kaufman and Martinez-
Vazquez (1987) for the case of a single-
plant bargaining structure. In this section 
we adapt that model to the case of a union 
with multiple bargaining units. 
As originally shown by Bowen (1943), if 
elections are decided by simple majority 
rule and preferences are well ordered 
(single-peaked) and a function of a single 
variable, the preference of the median 
voter in the electorate is the outcome that 
will defeat all others in a sequence of 
pairwise elections. To apply the median 
voter model to union wage concessions, 
several assumptions are necessary. After 
listing these assumptions, we derive the 
implications of the model concerning the 
two questions we are trying to answer: 
What are the determinants of (1) the 
approval or rejection of the concession by 
the majority of the membership and (2) 
the support it receives from different 
bargaining units? We then critically exam­
ine the assumptions of the model and how 
its implications change when some of the 
original assumptions are relaxed. 
First, it is assumed that new contracts 
must be ratified by a majority of the rank 
and file and that the electoral process in 
the union allows a series of elections 
among all possible pairs of outcomes. 
Second, it is assumed that the wage rate is 
the only issue in the negotiations, and that 
each employed union member is treated 
equally (i.e., there are no side-payments). 
Third, it is assumed that there is a 
well-known order of layoff for all UAW 
members at General Motors; the determi­
nants of this order are described below. 
Finally, it is assumed that the union 
leadership, out of a political instinct for 
survival, actively pursues policies that will 
this assumption is untenable both within a bargaining 
unit and across units. Second, neither of the two 
models recognizes that union decisions are the result 
of a political process involving majority rule. There­
fore, the monopoly and efficient contract models 
cannot be used to explain the nature of the coalition 
within a union that would favor a concession or to 
predict unambiguously when the union will accept 
such a policy. 
THE 1982 GM-UAW NEGOTIATIONS 187 
receive the support of a majority of the 
rank and file. 
The implications of the model can now 
be derived with the help of Figure 1. Let 
D\ represent the labor demand curve for 
General Motors in 1979. Given the union 
wage_ of Wi, total employment was L\\ 
L\—L represents the number of laid-off 
workers at that date. We assume that the 
L\ employed workers can be ordered 
along the horizontal axis on the basis of 
their order of potential layoff, the List 
worker being the first to lose his or her 
job, the Lnth being the last. Two assump­
tions give rise to this rank ordering. First, 
within a plant we assume, following the 
actual practice at GM, that the order of 
layoff is by seniority. Second, we assume 
that across plants there is also a distinct 
order of layoff based on differences in the 
marginal cost of production, with layoffs 
and shutdown taking place first at the 
Wage 
Type C Type B Type A 
Plants Plants Plants 
Type A plants = plants experiencing massive layoffs. 
Type B plants = plants experiencing some layoffs. 
Type C plants = plants with steady employment. 
L = total union membership, 
t-i = employed membership at wage Hq. 
L? = employed membership at wage W, after de­
mand decreases to D2. 
Ci = median union member. 
H'„, = preferred wage of median member given de­
mand curve D2. 
Figure 1. Pattern of Voting Among Union 
Members on a Tentative Wage 
Concession Agreement. 
highest-cost plant, then at the next highest-
cost plant, and so on. We will attempt to 
justify that assumption more fully below. 
Because of the economic events outlined 
above, the labor demand curve at General 
Motors between 1979 and 1982 shifted to 
the left as represented by the demand 
curve D2, and at the prevailing wage of 
Wj, employment fell to L2. We can 
consider now the first question—will the 
rank and file agree to a wage concession? 
Assume that the median union member 
in terms of the order of layoff is the f^th 
worker. As shown in Kaufman and Marti­
nez-Vazquez (1987), a necessary condition 
for a majority Yes vote is that the median 
voter be threatened with unemployment if 
there is not a wage concession. Only then 
will a majority of the union membership 
find it in their self-interest to accept a 
wage cut in order to preserve their jobs. 
Given the way Figure 1 is drawn, this 
condition is satisfied, since the L2- L\ 
layoffs include the median. The second 
condition that is necessary for majority 
approval of a wage cut is that the median 
voter's new preferred wage Wm still yields 
him or her a higher level of utility than 
any other alternative outcome (such as 
quitting and finding a new job or early 
retirement). Thus, if the median member 
could find other employment paying a 
wage higher than Wm, he or she would be 
better off to vote against the concession, 
even though it means losing the present 
job. The sufficient condition cannot be 
directly shown in Figure 1. If both 
conditions are satisfied, a proposed wage 
concession from W] to Wm would win 
majority approval by one vote in excess of 
50 percent of the rank and file. Note that 
any other wage proposed by the leader­
ship would be defeated by Wm in a 
sequence of pairwise elections. 
Consider now the second question: 
What determines why some bargaining 
units voted heavily for the concession 
contract whereas others voted heavily 
against it? This question can also be 
answered with the help of Figure 1. To do 
so, we must explicitly focus on employ­
ment prospects in different plants of the 
company. To keep the graphical analysis 
J 
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manageable, we assume that each GM 
plant is one of three possible types, 
represented by Plants A, B, and C in 
Figure 1. Given the new demand curve D2, 
type A plants (the high-cost plants) either 
are shut down or suffer massive layoffs, 
type B plants continue to operate but 
suffer some layoffs, and type C plants 
continue to operate with 1979 levels of 
employment. Although the assumption 
that there are only three types of plants 
clearly would be arbitrary in some circum­
stances, most plants at General Motors in 
the 1980—82 period did (as described 
above) fall into one of these three groups. 
Let us assume for the sake of argument 
that, as in Figure 1, the number of layoffs 
includes the median voter (the Lmth), and 
also that the sufficient condition is satis­
fied so that a majority of workers in the 
company will support a concession from 
Wi to Wm. Support for the concession, 
however, will be quite different among the 
three types of plants. 
A key insight provided by the median 
voter model is that the majority coalition 
of the membership in favor of concessions 
extends from the top of the layoff 
distribution (the L„th worker) down to the 
median (the Lmth). Surprisingly, although 
the political pressure on the union leader­
ship to negotiate concessions comes from 
the Li — L laid-off workers, the workers 
below the median are the ones who in the 
actual vote will oppose concessions. The 
reasoning is straightforward. The L,n — L 
laid-off workers will vote against a wage 
concession because at the wage W,„ they 
will still remain unemployed. The Ln — Lm 
workers, on the other hand, would vote 
for the concession. 
The rationale for a Yes vote on the part 
of the L% —Lm workers is self-evident—a 
wage cut from W\ to W% saves their jobs. 
The remainder of the majority coalition in 
favor of concessions comes from the 
Ln — Li workers, who would keep their 
jobs even without a concession. The 
reason these workers would vote for a 
wage cut to Wm is that if they did not the 
median voter could, in a continuous 
sequence of elections, form a different 
majority coalition of union members (such 
as those in the lower half of the layoff 
distribution) who would support a larger 
wage cut than Wm. Given the inevitability 
of the concession, the L„ — L2 workers, 
therefore, support Wm only because it 
minimizes the pay cut they will have to 
accept. 
The implications of the model for the 
voting pattern among bargaining units can 
be summarized as follows. Contrary to 
what might be expected, the vote in type A 
plants (the plants that suffered massive 
layoffs and in which a wage cut would not 
save jobs) should be overwhelmingly op­
posed to concessions. Because these plants 
lost so many jobs, their workers would 
support the initial decision to negotiate a 
concession. Thus, as Cappelli (1985) claims, 
the likelihood that a plant will agree to 
negotiate a concession increases with the 
number of layoffs experienced by the 
plant's union members. Our model shows, 
however, that in the actual vote the workers 
in type A plants would vote against the 
concession because it would not save their 
jobs. 
In type B plants, the model predicts that 
the vote should be split, with some 
workers favoring and others opposing a 
concession. The workers voting against a 
concession will be those below the median 
in the layoff distribution who do not see 
the concessions as being large enough to 
save their jobs. Voting for the concession 
in type B plants are two groups of 
workers: those who are threatened with 
layoff and see the concession as saving 
their jobs, and those who have secure jobs 
but want to avoid any larger cut in wages. 
Finally, the vote in type C plants should 
be consistently in favor of the concessions. 
This prediction also seems counterintui­
tive, since type C plants have experienced 
no layoffs.4 But even though none of these 
workers will lose their jobs if a concession 
is defeated, they reluctantly vote for a 
wage cut to Wm to avoid an even bigger 
concession. 
Qualifications. The predictions derived 
so far are based on assumptions that in 
4 This prediction is also unexpected since, as 
a r g u e d  b y  C a p p e l l i  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  t h e  w o r k e r s  i n  t y p e  C 
plants are the ones who are most likely to oppose the 
initial decision to negotiate a concession. 
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some cases clearly do not fully match the 
case under study (the UAW and General 
Motors in 1982). We therefore need to 
discuss how relaxing these assumptions 
affects the predictions of the model. 
The first assumption concerns the na­
ture of the electoral process. Rather than a 
sequence of pairwise elections, the elec­
toral process in the GM-UAW negotiations 
is limited to one or at most a few votes. 
This fact has a large impact on the 
predicted voting pattern. The motivation 
for the workers with relatively secure jobs 
in type C plants to vote for the concession 
is that if they do not, the majority of 
laid-off workers could form a new coali­
tion and win a majority vote for an even 
larger wage cut. If, to take the extreme 
case, there were only one election, the 
pressure on type C plant workers to vote 
Yes would be removed —they could vote 
No and keep their jobs at the wage W] 
with no threat of another vote. Given less 
than perfect democracy, therefore, the 
union leadership faces a serious problem 
in gaining a majority Yes vote, since many 
workers with job security may defect to the 
side opposing a concession. 
The limited nature of the electoral 
process leads to a second consideration 
ruled out in the simple model—the possi­
bility of side-payments. As just noted, one 
problem facing the union leadership is 
that with only one or several votes, many 
secure workers might vote against the 
concession. One possible strategy on the 
leadership's part is to "buy" the votes of 
the secure workers by making side-
payments. One example of side-payments 
in the GM-UAW contract is the GIS 
program, for which only currently em­
ployed workers with high seniority were 
eligible. A second example is the profit 
sharing program, again with value only 
for currently employed workers. Paradox­
ically, although the ultimate objective of 
the concession contract is to protect union 
members suffering (or threatened with) 
the hardship of being laid off, the contract 
is written to discriminate against them and 
to benefit those with more secure jobs. An 
implication of the model, therefore, is that 
the No vote in type A plants will also be 
due to resentment over the perceived 
inequity in the distribution of benefits 
among the union rank and file. 
A third consideration is the role of 
uncertainty. Heavily influencing each work­
er's vote are the questions whether he will 
be laid off (how far to the left the labor 
demand curve will shift) and whether a 
wage concession will save his job (how 
elastic the labor demand curve is). Al­
though in the model the answers to these 
questions were assumed to be known with 
certainty, in the context of the economic 
events of 1980—82 they were most likely 
shrouded in uncertainty. 
This uncertainty affects the model in 
two ways. First, the necessary condition 
for acceptance of a wage concession 
changes slightly —it is not necessary that a 
majority of the membership actually lose 
their jobs at the prevailing wage Wj, but 
only that a majority perceive a threat to 
their jobs. Second, as Ross (1948:80-93) 
emphasized, the typical union member is 
likely to have a very imprecise guess as to 
what the labor demand curve's position 
and its elasticity are. Of course, the greater 
the perceived elasticity of demand, the more 
jobs a wage concession will be thought to 
save and the bigger the Yes vote. One fac­
tor affecting each worker's subjective esti­
mate of the elasticity of demand will be the 
attitude of his local president toward the 
concession. Presumably, the local presi­
dent would favor the concession if he thinks 
that it would save or increase jobs in the 
unit. A second factor will be the labor re­
lations climate in the plant—the more adv­
ersarial that climate, the more the workers 
will distrust the company and its claims that 
a cut in wages will save jobs. Of course, the 
company can directly affect the worker's 
estimate of the job-saving potential of a con­
cession if, as at GM, it promises in advance 
that certain plants will not be closed. 
A final consideration is the number of 
issues in the contract. To derive a unique 
voting outcome, one of the necessary 
assumptions in the median voter model is 
that there is only one issue in the election. 
In the GM-UAW contract, however, the 
wage rate was only one of numerous 
contract provisions; some of the others 
were the GIS program, the profit sharing 
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program, the moratorium on plant clos­
ings, and the cut in paid personal holidays. 
With so many issues open to vote, in a 
sequence of elections, the median voter 
model would generally produce no single 
winner, but a series of cyclical majority 
coalitions. But if the election process were 
restricted to one single vote (the particular 
contract submitted by the UAW leader­
ship), we would expect support for the 
contract to vary across plants according to 
our analysis above. 
Empirical Analysis 
The model developed in the previous 
section suggests a number of hypotheses 
concerning the pattern of voting among 
UAW bargaining units in the 1982 negoti­
ations. In this section we use regression 
analysis to test these hypotheses. The data, 
as explained more fully below, came 
largely from a survey questionnaire an­
swered by the chairperson of each bargain­
ing unit. The specification of the regres­
sion is 
(1) ln[PYES/(l — PYES)] = PO + PJEMP 
+ (32SAVE + 03EMPSAVE + (34THREAT 
+ 05CLOSE2 + 06CLOSE3 + p7REL2 
+ P8REL3 + PgSUPPORT + P10PARTS 
+ PnWCOLLAR + Pi2OTHER 
+ P13YEAR + P14UN + P15WAGE + 6. 
The unit of observation is the bargaining 
unit. On the left-hand side of the equa­
tion, PYES is the percentage of votes in 
favor of the concessions. Estimation of the 
equation with PYES as the dependent 
variable using OLS could yield not only 
inefficient estimates but also predicted 
values outside the zero-one range. To 
control for these difficulties, we employ 
logit-weighted regression analysis in which 
the dependent variable is the natural log 
of the odds.5 The definitions and means 
of the independent variables are given in 
Table 1. 
The data source for the voting results 
was the official tally furnished by UAW 
5 The weights used in the weighted least squares 
regression were computed as: [NyPYES,(1 -PYES7)]'/2. 
See Theil (1971). 
national headquarters. The data for the 
independent variables (except UN and 
WAGE) were obtained from a questionnaire 
mailed in early 1983 to the chairperson of 
each bargaining unit. A total of 102 usable 
questionnaires were returned, represent­
ing a relatively high response rate of 60 
percent. The mean of the variable PYES for 
our sample was 55.5 percent, which is not 
statistically different (by a t test) from the 
population mean. Other characteristics of 
the two distributions were also quite 
similar.6 
The regression results, reported in 
Table 2, show an interesting voting pat­
tern across bargaining units. They also 
lend support to the predictions of the 
model. Consider first the variables EMP, 
SAVE, and EMP SAVE. The inducement for 
the membership to vote Yes for the 
concession is the prospect that the conces­
sion will save jobs. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for SAVE 
shows that the vote for the concession was, 
in fact, much higher in bargaining units 
where the membership believed jobs would 
be saved.7 The negative coefficient on the 
6 For example, the standard deviations were 21.2 
and 22.1 for the sample and population mean, 
respectively. The skewness and Kurtosis measures 
were, respectively, -.109 and -.175, and -.637 
and -.524. The range was 85.8 for the sample and 
95.1 for the population. 
' The content validity of the variable SAVE is 
admittedly subject to some question, since the data 
came from an ex post response of the chairperson 
rather than a survey of the membership prior to the 
vote. Although the questionnaire specifically asked 
the chairperson to assess the membership's belief 
concerning whether jobs would be saved, it is possible 
that the response we obtained reflected only the 
chairperson's own personal opinion. If the chairper­
son's opinion varied significantly, on average, from 
the membership's, the resulting measurement error 
would bias the estimated coefficient 011 the variable 
SAVE toward zero. The coefficient is, however, 
significantly different from zero. 
It is also possible that the membership had no idea 
of whether jobs would be saved and simply relied on 
the opinion of the chairperson in making up their 
mind whether to vote Yes or No. The fact that other 
variables besides SUPPORT were statistically signifi­
cant, and that the correlations between SUPPORT and 
PYES and SUPPORT and SAVE were far from perfect 
(-.53 and .45), suggests that the position of the 
chairperson and the voting of the membership were 
THE 1982 GM-UAW NEGOTIATIONS 191 
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Means. 
Variable Name Definition Mean 
PYES 
EMP 
SAVE 
EMP-SAVE 
THREAT 
CLOSE2 
CLOSES 
REL2 
RELS 
WCOLLAR 
YEAR 
UN 
WAGE 
Percent of votes cast in the bargaining unit in favor of the concessions. 55.44 
Algebraic value of the percentage change in employment over the preceding year - 10.58 
(e.g., -20% or + 10%). 
Dummy variable equal to one if the chairperson reported that at the time of .45 
the vote "membership believed the contract concessions would save jobs in their 
bargaining unit." The omitted category is "concessions would not save jobs." 
Interaction term. .22 
Dummy variable equal to one if a plant in the bargaining unit was one of the .01 
four that GM promised not to close if the concessions were approved. 
Dummy variable equal to one if "membership worried somewhat" about the .33 
plant closing. 
Dummy variable equal to one if "membership worried a lot" about the plant .18 
closing. The omitted category is "membership not worried much." 
Dummy variable equal to one if "the relationship between the union and com- .43 
pany, compared to other bargaining units, is about average." 
Dummy variable equal to one if "the relationship between the union and com- .15 
pany is worse than average." The omitted category is "relations better than 
average." 
Dummy variable equal to one if "the chairperson personally opposed the con- .34 
tract concessions." The omitted category is "chairperson supported concessions." 
Dummy variable equal to one if "workers are primarily engaged in parts .41 
manufacture." 
Dummy variable equal to one if "workers are primarily engaged in R&D or .08 
'white collar'jobs." 
Dummy variable equal to one if workers are engaged in "other" (e.g., ware- .27 
housing, locomotive manufacture) jobs. The omitted category is "car and 
truck assembly." 
Year the plant or facility was built (calculated as year - 1900) 49.7 
Unemployment rate in April 1982 in the state in which the bargaining unit is 11.98 
located. 
Average hourly earnings in 1982 in the SMSA or, if SMSA-level earnings 10.06 
figures are not available, in the state. 
Random error term. 
interaction term EMP-SAVE indicates that 
the prospect of saving jobs had a larger 
positive impact on the percent Yes vote in 
bargaining units that had previously suf­
fered large declines in employment than 
in other units. This result supports one of 
the basic predictions of the model —that a 
large Yes vote will occur in bargaining 
indeed influenced by a consideration of benefits and 
costs as predicted by the median voter model. 
Finally, a third possibility is that the chairperson's 
response about the membership's belief concerning 
the number of jobs likely to be saved by the 
concession was merely a post hoc rationalization of 
how the membership voted. This assertion is difficult 
to disprove, but we would note that the correlation 
between PYES and SAVE (.45) is much less than 1.0. 
units where large layoffs occur and the 
membership believes that a concession will 
restore jobs (type B plants in the model). 
A second important prediction of the 
model is that the weakest support for the 
concessions will be in bargaining units that 
had suffered large layoffs but in which the 
membership did not believe jobs would be 
saved by concession (type A plants). This 
prediction is also supported by the results. 
When SAVE is set equal to zero (and thus 
EMP SAVE = 0) in Table 2, it is seen that 
the larger the decline in employment over 
the previous year (EMP takes negative 
values), the lower the percent Yes vote. If 
SAVE is set equal to one (implying the 
membership believed jobs would be saved), 
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Table 2. Determinants of the 1982 
GM-UAW Concession Vote, 
(logit-weighted regression results) 
Independent Estimated 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
EMP 0.313 x 102 4.27* 
SAVE 0.454 7.86* 
EMP-SAVE -0.103 x 10"1 6.09* 
THREAT 1.371 3.65* 
CLOSE2 0.111 2.91* 
CLOSE3 0.257 4.82* 
REL2 -0.425 x 10"1 1.10 
REL3 -0.269 5.11* 
SUPPORT -0.532 12.55* 
PARTS 0.469 x 10"1 1.06 
WCOLLAR 0.338 3.64* 
OTHER 0.137 2.58* 
YEAR -0.273 x 10"2 2.67* 
UN -0.183 x 10"1 2.42* 
WAGE 0.278 x 10"2 4.72* 
Constant -0.183 -
R2 = 0.447 Pf = 0.442 F = 78.44 
* Significant at the .05 level. 
however, bargaining units with large em­
ployment losses were more likely to vote for 
the concessions.8 Finally, perhaps the most 
counterintuitive result but one predicted 
by the model is that bargaining units that 
had experienced a growth in employment 
(type C plants in the model) also were 
more likely than other plants to vote for 
the concession (EMP takes positive values).9 
Next, consider the variables THREAT, 
CLOSE2, and CLOSE3. The coefficient on the 
8 In addition to obtaining an estimate of the 
percentage change in employment over the preced­
ing year, the survey questionnaire also asked the 
chairperson whether the bargaining unit's employ­
ment had "increased," "remained the same," "de­
creased somewhat," or "decreased a lot." The 
responses were coded as dummy variables and used 
in the regression equations in place of EMQ. (The 
category "increased" was omitted from the equation 
to serve as the reference group.) The estimated 
coefficients were all negative and statistically signifi­
cant. Each of the dummy variables was also inter­
acted with the variable SAVE. All of the interaction 
terms were positive and statistically significant. 
9 If SAVE = 1, however, the regression results 
indicate that type C plants are less likely to vote for 
concessions, contrary to the predictions of the model. 
This problem, we believe, is not serious, since of the 
twelve plants in the sample that had EMP > 0, only 
two also had SAVE = 1. 
variable THREAT is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that the percent Yes 
vote was higher in those plants that GM 
threatened to close if concessions were not 
approved than in other plants. The rela­
tionship between a cut in wages and 
increased employment opportunities was 
quite clear for these bargaining units, and, 
not unexpectedly, they voted heavily in 
favor of the concession. The coefficients 
on the variables CLOSE2 and CLOSE3 were 
also positive and significant. The degree 
of support for the concessions increased if 
the members of the bargaining unit were 
somewhat worried about the plant closing 
and rose even further if they were quite 
worried. These results suggest that union 
members threatened by layoffs (i.e., those 
in type B plants) regarded the concession 
as a way to protect their jobs from a plant 
closing.10 
According to the model, a key determi­
nant of the amount of support among the 
membership for a concession is the degree 
to which they believe both that a conces­
sion is necessary to protect their jobs and 
that it will increase their job security. We 
hypothesize that the labor relations cli­
mate between the company and union in 
the bargaining unit has an important 
impact on how the union membership 
perceive these issues. In particular, it is 
predicted that the more hostile or adversa­
rial the relationship is, the lower the 
percent Yes vote will be. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on the 
variable REL3 supports this prediction. The 
coefficient for RF.L2 is also negative, though 
statistically not significant. One implica­
tion, therefore, is that a company is more 
likely to win support for a concession if it 
has established a cooperative, nonadversar-
ial relationship with the union than if it 
10 It can be argued that the effect of a threatened 
plant closing on the percent Yes vote should also 
depend on whether the membership thought the 
concessions would save jobs. To test this possibility, 
we included interaction terms CLOSE2-SAVE and 
CLOSE3-SAVE in the regression. The coefficients on 
these interaction terms were positive and statistically 
significant, but the coefficients on CLOSE2 and CLOSE.! 
fell to insignificance. The rest of the coefficients 
remained largely unchanged from those reported in 
Table 2. 
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has not. A second important determinant 
of the membership's perceptions of the 
benefits and costs of a concession is the 
position of the chairperson of their bar­
gaining unit with respect to the conces­
sion. The sign on the variable SUPPORT is 
negative and statistically significant. This 
finding indicates that the percent Yes vote 
was lower where the chairperson opposed 
the concession. 
Additional variables in the model, to 
control for differences across plants, are 
YEAR, PARTS, WCOLLAR, and OTHER. Con­
sider first the variable YEAR. The regres­
sion results indicate that the newer the 
plant, the lower was the percent Yes vote. 
At first glance this result seems to contra­
dict the median voter model, since it 
predicts that workers in more secure jobs 
(such as in new plants) would vote for the 
concessions in order to avoid even larger 
concessions in the future. As was pointed 
out earlier, however, the incentive for 
workers with secure jobs to vote for the 
concessions is greatly reduced when they 
do not face the threat of repeated elec­
tions. We argued that one mechanism 
used by the UAW leadership to gain a Yes 
vote in this situation was to "bribe" secure 
workers with additional benefits, such as 
the Guaranteed Income Stream program. 
For workers in new plants, however, this 
inducement was probably not effective, 
since they did not have the seniority to 
qualify for the program; hence, as the 
regression indicates, they voted against 
acceptance of the concessions. 
Next consider the variables PARTS, 
WCOLLAR, and OTHER. Although workers 
in parts plants were especially vulnerable 
to layoff because of outsourcing, the 
insignificant coefficient on the variable 
PARTS suggests that once previous trends 
in employment, the threat of plant clo­
sure, and the likelihood of jobs being 
saved by the concessions are controlled 
for, there was no net difference between 
the voting behavior of workers in these 
plants and that of workers in assembly 
plants. Other things equal, however, white-
collar workers and "other" workers were 
more likely to vote for the concessions 
than were assembly workers. It might be 
conjectured that this result reflects a less 
antagonistic attitude toward the company 
on the part of these workers relative to 
production workers, but such an explana­
tion is weakened by the fact that a variable 
measuring the labor relations climate in 
the bargaining unit is already included in 
the regression. 
The final two variables included in the 
regression are UN and WAGE. The model 
predicts that the attitude of the member­
ship toward a concession should be influ­
enced by their alternative employment 
and income opportunities—the better those 
opportunities, the lower the support for 
the concession." Therefore, the unemploy­
ment variable was expected to take a 
positive sign and the wage variable a 
negative sign. The sign on each variable, 
however, is the opposite of that predicted, 
and both coefficients are statistically signif­
icant.12 One possible explanation for these 
inconsistent results is that the information 
used for these two variables is very 
aggregated. For this reason, it may be that 
these two variables, rather than serving as 
proxies or the actual employment oppor­
tunities facing General Motors workers, 
are picking up regional differences across 
plants. 
Conclusion 
Concession bargaining has been one of 
the most important industrial relations 
developments of the 1980s. Surprisingly, 
however, there has been little research on 
11 Another determinant of the alternative income 
available to workers should they lose their job is the 
level of unemployment benefits. An unemployment 
benefits variable was not included in the regression, 
however, since SUB payments from the company 
equalized total benefits at 95 percent of take-home 
pay across all states, eliminating any variation in this 
variable. This statement must be qualified slightly, 
since some workers in April 1982 were not receiving 
full SL1B payments due to depletion of the fund, but 
no data are available on the incidence of such 
underpayment across plants. 
12 To test the robustness of the regression, we 
dropped the variables UN and WAGE from the 
equation and then reestimated it. The results 
(available from the authors on request) were quite 
similar. 
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the factors that determine whether a 
union will agree to accept concessions. In 
this paper we attempt to provide both 
theoretical and empirical evidence on this 
subject, through an analysis of the 1982 
GM-UAW negotiations. The paper shows 
that in a multiplant company such as 
General Motors, there is likely to be a 
considerable divergence of opinion among 
the union membership over the desirabil­
ity of a concession, reflecting the unequal 
distribution across plants of the benefits 
and costs of a wage cut. 
To analyze this divergence of opinion, 
we used the median voter model to derive 
hypotheses concerning the pattern of 
voting among plants for a concession 
contract. Contrary to conventional wis­
dom, the model predicts that in many 
cases workers in plants that have experi­
enced a large number of layoffs are the 
ones most likely to vote against conces­
sions, whereas workers in plants with 
steady employment levels are more likely 
to vote for the concession. The empirical 
analysis of the voting data from the 
GM-UAW contract ratification in 1982 
lends considerable support to these hypoth­
eses. As predicted, the strongest opposi­
tion to the concessions came from plants 
that had suffered large layoffs and in 
which the membership did not believe the 
concessions would save jobs. Where the 
membership did believe that jobs would be 
saved by a cut in labor cost, however, the 
vote was much more in favor of conces­
sions. The regression results also indicate 
that, surprisingly, the vote for acceptance 
of the concessions was higher in bargain­
ing units where employment had re­
mained steady or had increased during 
the previous twelve months. Finally, we 
also found, as hypothesized, that support 
for the concessions was greater in plants 
where the company and union had a 
cooperative relationship. 
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